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Abstract 
We  examine  the  impact  of  football  player  migration  on  their  origin  countries‟ 
international football performance. In our model, players acquire superior skills in foreign clubs, 
so emigration of players improves national team performance. We have collected information on 
the club  of employment of national  team  players for  most countries  in  the world. We have 
constructed an original migration index, weighting each emigrant player by the quality of his 
club  of  employment.  We  find  strong  and  robust  support  for  the  theoretical  prediction  that 
migration of players to foreign leagues improves their origin countries‟ international football 
performance. 
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1.  Introduction  
It is well known today that international migration affects the level of human capital (in a 
broad interpretation) in origin countries in both positive and negative ways. In the short term, 
migration of skilled workers leads to a direct loss of human capital for the origin countries of 
migrants.  In  the  long  term,  migration  may  induce  human  capital  gains.  The  possibility  of 
migration  increases  individual  incentives  to  acquire  education.  Remittances  allow  migrants‟ 
families to afford educating their children. Some of the migrants return to their origin countries 
after a while, with new skills acquired abroad. Depending on the circumstances, the net impact of 
skilled  emigration  on  human  capital  can  be  either  negative  or  positive,  what  is  sometimes 
referred to as “brain drain” or “brain gain”.
2 
A very interesting sector to study these effects is sports, where international migration is 
a particularly important phenomenon . The share of migrants in the main sports leagues in 
Europe and North America is  very large compared to  average economic sector standards, in 
particular for the top leagues.  In some cases,  European first division teams  employed 100% 
migrant  players.  In contrast to the  general findings on migration , the sports literature has 
typically been dominated by  the negative view that  „muscle  drain‟  undermines  the  sporting 
capacity of developing countries
3.  
In  this  paper  we  focus  on  football  (soccer)  player  migration ,  which  has  grown 
exponentially over the past decade.  Migration of  football players  accelerated  with  the  1995 
Bosman ruling, which removed restrictions on the number of players originating from European 
countries that could  be recruited by European clubs, and which was  extended to other  origin 
                                                           
2 See e.g. Adams (2003), Stark (2004), Özden and Schiff (2005), Boucher et al. (2005), Beine et al. (2008). 
3 See e.g. Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2009) for a review. 2 
 
countries  (and  sports)  by  the  Malaja,  Kolpak  and  Simutenkov  cases  and  the  2000  Cotonou 
agreement.
4 Similarly to the familiar brain drain concerns, t he globalization of the market for 
football  players  has  been  accused   of  causing  a  “muscle  drain”  for  developing  countries, 
depriving them of their most talented players for the benefit  of professional  leagues in  rich 
countries.
5 
Interestingly, a particularity of football player migration differentiates muscle drain from 
brain drain. Unlike most skilled migrants, who can only work in one country at a time, football 
players can play for their home country national team , while being hired by foreign country 
clubs. Thus,  not only are national teams not deprived of their talents , but they may actually 
benefit from the additional skills acquired by their players training in top European leagues.  
Some analysts pointed out the concern that  European clubs do not always allow their 
foreign players to participate in international competitions, like the Africa  Cup of nations for 
example, which erodes the capacity of the home country to use its most talented athletes in 
international competition, leading to poor performances of developing countries in world sport 
events (Andreff, 2004, 2009). However, ad hoc observations suggest that developing countries 
have done better, not worse, since the start of substantial migration  of their football players to 
rich country competitions. African teams have performed increasingly well in World Cups in the 
past decades. Despite the fact that many Ghanaian players are employed by European clubs, 
Ghana  managed  to  reach  the quarter final  in  the 2010  World  Cup .  This  is  an important 
                                                           
4 The Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov cases extend the Bosman jurisprudence to different sports and to citizens of 
Central Eastern European and CIS countries (Andreff, 2006). The 2000 Cotonou agreement, signed by the European 
Union  and  77  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries,  allows  athlete  transfers  from  the  latter  area  under  the 
qualification of assimilated Europeans (Chaix, 2004). For discussions on the implications of the Bosman ruling, see 
e.g. Simmons (1997), Szymanski (1999), Antonioni and Cubbin (2000), Ericson (2000), Feess and Muelheusser, 
(2003), Penn (2006), Binder and Findlay (2009) and Frick (2009). 
5 See e.g. Gerrard (2002), Magee and Sugden ( 2002), Andreff (2004, 2009), Poli  (2006, 2008); Darby (2007a, 
2007b), Darby, Akindes and Kirwin (2007). 3 
 
achievement for an African country, with only two precedents: Cameroon in 1990 and Senegal in 
2002.  Our  aim  is  to  rigorously  analyze  the  impact  of  football  player  migration  on  the 
performance of national teams. 
Empirical  studies  have  shown  that  economic,  demographic,  cultural,  historical  and 
climatic factors are important determinants of international football performance (Hoffmann, Lee 
and Ramasamy, 2002; Houston and Wilson, 2002; Torgler, 2006; MacMillan and Smith, 2007). 
Recent  empirical  contributions  have  found  new  explanatory  factors,  such  as  linguistic 
heterogeneity (Yamamura, 2008), national institutions (Leeds and Leeds, 2009) and the level of 
health expenditures as a percentage of national income (Luiz and Fadal, 2010). 
To the best of our knowledge, five academic papers have analyzed, directly or indirectly, 
the effects of football players‟ migrations on national team performance. While all these papers 
make important contributions, they all have weaknesses as well. 
Milanovic (2005) is the first to consider this question. He focuses on the impact of player 
migration  on  inequality  between  teams,  rather  than  on  team  performance.  He  develops  a 
theoretical model predicting that the opening of football markets reduces inequality between 
national teams due to skills spillover between players. He provides descriptive statistics from the 
history of the World Cup suggesting that inequality between national teams, as measured by the 
average  goal  difference  between  winners  and  losers,  gradually  decreased  between  1950  and 
2002. This innovative paper has two potential weaknesses: the theoretical model is based on 
some  very  specific  assumptions  on  the  distribution  of  skills  between  countries  and  no 
econometric  analysis  is  provided.  Gelade  and  Dobson  (2007)  are  the  first  to  provide  an 
econometric analysis of the impact of migrations on national team performance. They estimate 
the effect of an expatriate index, measured by the percentage of players training abroad, on the 4 
 
comparative strength of national football teams. While controlling for the size of the talent pool, 
football culture, economic resources and the climate, they find a positive and highly significant 
coefficient for their expatriate index. However, their results may be biased by an endogeneity 
problem. The authors proxy the talent pool by a logarithmic measure of the total number of 
regular football players in  the country. This variable is prone to reverse causality, since  the 
performance of the national team may influence the popularity of the game, and therefore the 
number of regular players. Baur and Lehmann (2007) regress FIFA rankings on the number of 
imported and exported players. They find that national teams with a higher percentage of players 
under contract abroad perform better. However, the sample that is used for their study is rather 
limited:  players are only  considered  imports or exports if they were in  a national  team  that 
qualified for the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Moreover, the measures used for the market 
values  of  players  have  been  criticized  by  Frick  (2009).  Using  data  on  the  participation  of 
semifinals or finals in the World Cup and the European Championship from 1978 until 2006, 
Frick (2009) finds that the migration of players to the financially rewarding leagues in Western 
Europe does not improve national team performance. Another recent paper by Yamamura (2009) 
provides empirical evidence on the existence of football technology spillovers from developed to 
developing countries. The author considers the average world ranking points for the best leagues, 
i.e. Italy, England, Germany and Spain as a proxy for the most advanced technology level and 
finds  that  technology  transfers  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  performance  of  developing 
countries‟ national teams. However, this paper does not consider directly the role of migration in 
technology spillovers. Finally, none of these empirical studies draws upon an explicit theoretical 
framework.  5 
 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  football 
players‟ migration on national team performance by addressing some of these weaknesses. First, 
we  provide  a  theoretical  model  in  which  the  performance  of  the  national  team  is  explicitly 
computed as a function of players‟ endogenous migration rate. Contrarily to Milanovic (2005), 
we make no specific assumption on the distribution of players‟ skills among countries. Second, 
we  test  empirically  the  main  prediction  of  the  model,  i.e.  the  existence  of  a  positive  but 
decreasing effect of migrations on national team performance due to superior training acquired 
by migrating players in foreign clubs. Third, in order to quantify the skills spillover effect of 
migrating players, we construct a weighted migration index that takes into account the strength 
of the foreign clubs to which players migrated. Our index is a more accurate measure of skill 
acquisitions  through  migrations  than  the  percentage  of  migrant  players  used  by  Gelade  and 
Dobson (2007) and Frick (2009), since the quality of training varies considerably among clubs 
and leagues. Fourth, we use population size instead of the number of regular players as a proxy 
for the talent pool, in order to overcome reverse causality. Fifth, we use a much larger sample 
than Baur and Lehmann (2007) by including migrating players from all national teams. Finally, 
contrarily to Yamamura (2009), we explicitly analyze the effect of the migration channel on 
technology spillovers. 
Our theoretical framework assumes that there are two countries in the world, one of 
which has bigger football markets. Players can choose between training in a home club and 
training in a foreign club. Migration to a foreign club entails a cost, but it increases player‟s 
productivity and revenue if training is superior in the foreign club. We show that only the most 
talented players will migrate if the  revenue  gain  from  immigration  is  proportional to  innate 6 
 
talent.  We  compute  the  migration  rate  of  players  in  the  national  team  and  we  show  that 
performance is an increasing and concave function of the migration rate.  
We test these predictions using cross country data on national team performance and the 
club of employment of national squad players. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find 
that our weighted migration index has a positive and significant impact on the performance of 
national squads. This result is very robust across different specifications. We also find evidence 
for a diminishing impact of migrations as predicted by the theoretical model, although this result 
is less robust.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  the  theoretical 




2.  Theoretical Framework 
Assume there are two countries in the world: home and foreign. Each country has a 
national football team with   players. Player               in the home national team has an 
innate talent   ,  and player               in the foreign national team has an innate talent   
 . 
Players are ranked by increasing talent, such that                  and   
      
          
 . 
Let     ∑   
 
     be the total stock of talent of the home national team and      ∑   
   
     be the 
total stock of talent of the foreign national team.  
The talent of  each player  and the training that he  gets  in  the club he is  playing for 
determine  his  skills  for  football.  We  assume  that  the  skills     of  player     are  given  by  the 
function:  
                      (1) 
where    is the training level of player  .  
Players can choose to play for a foreign club, but they cannot play for the foreign national 
team.  
Without loss of generality, we assume that the market for football is bigger in the foreign 
country. Having access to bigger markets, foreign clubs earn higher revenues from each game 
and thus have more resources to invest in infrastructure, coaches, medical care and other training 
facilities.
6 Foreign country clubs therefore offer better training than home country clubs. 
                                                           
6 This assumption could be endogenized by solving the optimization problem of a club willing to maximize winning 
probability subject to the balanced budget constraint. 8 
 
For simplicity, we assume that players get a training level    if they play in  a home 
country club and        if they play in a foreign country club.
7  
Players‟ wages are an increasing function of their skills. We assume that a player with 
skills    earns    , with      . Players from the home national team earn more if they play in a 
foreign club, since             .  
In line with  the international  migrations  literature, we suppose that  migrating abroad 
entails a cost   for the players (Borjas, 1989). This cost includes moving expenditures, but also 
emotional and social costs of leaving one‟s home country, learning a new language, adapting to a 
new culture, etc.  
Player   will therefore migrate if 
                ,            (2) 
which is equivalent to 
       ̅               ⁄ .          (3) 
A player with a talent level equal to   ̅ is exactly indifferent between playing for a home club and 
migrating to a foreign club. Players with higher talent migrate to a foreign club and players with 
lower talent play for domestic clubs. 
Condition (3) implies that the minimum talent level inducing emigration increases with 
the migration cost and decreases with the difference in the quality of training between foreign 
                                                           
7  In  reality,  the  quality  of  clubs  in  a  country  is  obviously  not  homogenous.  The  parameters     and      can  be 
interpreted as an average of the training level in home and foreign country clubs respectively. 9 
 
and home clubs. It also implies that no foreign player is willing to work for a home club since 
that would imply bearing the migration cost and earning lower revenues. 
We can then define the football migration rate   as the share of national talent playing 
for a foreign club: 
    ∑   
 
   ̅   ∑   
 
    ⁄ .          (4) 
We can now relate the performance of the national team to migration. The performance 
of a team is given by its winning percentage. We follow Kesenne (2007) and define the winning 
percentage of a team by the following logit contest success function:  
               ⁄ ,            (5) 
where   is the probability that the home team wins a game against the foreign team,     ∑   
 
     
is the stock of skills of the home national team and      ∑   
   
     is the stock of skills of the 
foreign national team.  
As all players      ̅ from the home national team migrate to a foreign club, where they 
get a training equal to   , the winning percentage of the national team will be equal to: 
      ∑   
 ̅
         ∑   
 
   ̅       ∑   
 ̅
         ∑   
 
   ̅        ∑   
    
    ⁄      (6) 
We can express this winning percentage as a function of the football migration rate: 
    [               ] [                      ] ⁄        (7) 
Deriving   with respect to   gives: 
      ⁄                                           ⁄    .    (8) 10 
 
It follows from (8) that migration has a positive effect on national team performance.  
This positive effect depends on the assumption that migrating players obtain superior 
training  (      ).  This  is  a  reasonable  assumption,  if  one  admits  that  players‟  wages  are 
proportional to their skills and that migration is costly. Indeed, no player would be willing to 
bear the migration cost if foreign club wages were inferior to domestic club wages. 
We can check that performance is a concave function of the migration rate:   
        ⁄                                               ⁄    .    (9) 
Concavity is due to the shape of the contest success function (5). Different signs for the 
second order derivative could be obtained with a more general contest success function.
8   
Our theoretical model predicts that football players‟ migration rate to foreign clubs has a 
positive  but  diminishing  influence  on  the  performance  of  their  home  national  teams.  The 
following section provides empirical evidence supporting this argument. 
 
3.  Empirical Framework 
We test the predictions of the model using cross country data on FIFA countries‟ national 
team performance and the club of employment of their players. The following sections provide 
the definitions of the variables used, the data sources, the estimation techniques, the regression 
results and some extensions and robustness checks.  
 
                                                           
8 For example, the contest success function                   ⁄  used by Dietl, Franck and Lang (2008) could give 
either a concave or a convex performance function, depending on the value of  . 11 
 
3.1. Variables and Data 
Following the football economics literature, we measure national team performance by the 
number  of  FIFA  points  each  national  team  has  obtained  during  games  played  against  other 
national teams. The number of points per game depend on the outcome of the game, on the 
importance of the game, on the strength of the opponent and on the strength of the regional 
confederation. The performance of a team is computed as the sum of current year performance 
and a three-year weighted average of previous annual performances, with a gradual decline in 
importance of results. Table 1 gives the twenty national teams with the highest number of FIFA 
points in February 2010.  
In order to quantify the effect of migrating players‟ skill acquisitions, we construct a 
migration index that takes into account the strength of the league and the division of the club to 
which national team players migrated.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature has used the percentage of migrating 
players as a measure of the migration rate (Gelade and Dobson, 2007). However, this index does 
not take into account the fact that some players migrate to average foreign leagues, where the 
quality of training is only slightly better than what they could obtain at home, while other players 
migrate to top European leagues, where the quality of training is the best in the world. A player 
migrating to a club in a higher quality league will acquire better skills, so he should get a higher 
weight in the migration index.  
We collected data on the club of employment for the players of all national teams. For 
confederations organizing confederation championships, we use the squad compositions during 12 
 
those championships.
9 For AFC countries we use the 2007 AFC Asian Cup squads , for CAF 
countries, we use the 2008 Africa Cup of Nations squads, for CONCACAF countries we use the 
2007  CONCACAF  Gold  Cup  squads,  for CONMEBOL  countries  we  use  the  2007  Copa 
América squads and for UEFA countries we use the UEFA Euro 2008 squads. The OFC Nations 
Cup is organized for OFC countries, but squad compositions of this championship were not  
available.  Data  on  the  national  squads  for  non  participating  countries  were  taken  from 
http://www.national-football-teams.com/v2/national.php.  
Note that we use 2010 data for team performance and  2007 or 2008 data  for national 
squad composition. The reason for using lagged  data for the squad composition is that  players 
who have emigrated only recently are unlikely to contribute with newly acquired  skills to the 
performance of their national squads, since acquiring skills is  a process that takes time (FIFA, 
2006).  
We attach the following migration index to each national team: 
      
 
 ∑    ∑
 
         ,          (10) 
where   is the total number of players in the national squad,     is the number of players that 
migrated towards a division   club in UEFA league  , and    is the relative UEFA ranking of 
league  . This index assigns a higher weight to players migrating to stronger leagues and to 
higher divisions.  
                                                           
9 There are six football confederations; the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Confédération Africaine de 
Football (CAF), the Confederation of North Central American and Carribean Association Football (CONCACAF), 
the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL), the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) and the 
Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), currently consisting of respectively 46, 52, 35, 10, 11 and 
53 football nations.   13 
 
Note that only national team players migrating to UEFA leagues are computed in our 
migration index. This is not an important restriction, given that in the African continent, which is 
the confederation with the highest number of migrating players towards another confederation 
than UEFA, only around 30 out of almost 500 migrating players were not playing in UEFA 
countries.  
The UEFA ranking of league    is the ranking associated with the sum of the five UEFA 
coefficients  of  the  last  five  years.  The  UEFA  coefficients  are  calculated  based  on  the 
performance of club teams in the main European club competitions, the Champions League and 
the Europa League. In general, each participating team gets two points for a win, one point for a 
draw and some bonus points for proceeding further in the tournament. The UEFA coefficient 
assigned to a country is the sum of points obtained by all the participating teams from that 
country  divided  by  the  number  of  those  teams.  The  data  is  taken  from 
http://www.xs4all.nl/~kassiesa/bert/uefa.  
In order to get rid of the inverse relationship between UEFA ranking and performance, 
we assign the following relative ranking to league   (Barajas, Fernández-Jardón and Crolley, 
2005): 
                                 ⁄            (11) 
where       is the number of UEFA countries and         is the position of league   in the 
UEFA ranking.  
Our migration index takes values between 0 (no player was playing in a foreign UEFA 
league)  and  1  (all  players  were  playing  in  highest  ranked  foreign  UEFA  league).  Table  2 
provides  the  twenty  national  squads  with  the  highest  migration  index.  Table  3  provides  the 14 
 
twenty national squads with a zero migration index in our sample, with the exclusion of the 
Oceanic and Asian confederation countries.
10 
We  control  for  a  number  of  explanatory  variables,  i n  line  with  the  literature  on  
international football performance. Following Hoffmann, Lee and Ramasamy (2002), Houston 
and Wilson  (2002) and Torgler (2006), we  include GDP per capita and its quadratic form  as 
control variables.
11 Individuals living in wealthier countries are  more likely to participate in 
leisure activities and subsequently in competitive sports. Furthermore, wealthier countries  have 
more resources to spend on   health care, training facilities  and other productivity enhancing 
inputs.  One  expects  a  positive  relationship  bet ween  income  and  international  football  
performance. Data on GDP per capita  is taken from the International Monetary Fund  World 
Economic Outlook 2009. 
We control for countries‟ population size and its quadratic term, as a proxy for the pool 
of talent. We use population data for the year 2009, from the CIA World Fact Book.  
Countries  with  a  longer  football  history  are  likely  to  perform  better  in  international 
competitions. In line with the existing literature, we use the year of foundation of the national 
football  association  to  measure  football  history.
12  This  data  has   also  been  gathered  from 
http://www.national-football-teams.com/v2/national.php.  
                                                           
10 Only the Oceanic confederation squad of New  Zealand  and the  Asian confederation  squads of  Afghanistan, 
Australia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Korea DPR, Korea Republic, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, 
Thailand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had players migrating to UEFA leagues in our sample. 
11 Since football is an inexpensive sport compared to other sports, poorer people might be overinvesting in it. 
Moreover, if income increases, not only other outdoor sports will act as substitutes for football but also indoor 
activities such as video and DVD games.   
12 Since some former members of socialist political entities like the  Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
have relatively recent foundations, but presumably a football tradition dating back to the affiliation with those 
former entitities, we substituted the year of foundation of the national football association by the year of absorption 
into the respective entity for those countries for which foundation was only after the dissolution of the large entity 
and if a national football association of this larger entity had been founded before. A similar approach is undertaken 15 
 
Next, a temperature variable is introduced to take into account the effect of climate on 
football  performance.  Following earlier contributions  (Hoffmann,  Lee  and Ramasamy, 2002; 
Macmillan  and  Smith,  2007),  we  measure  temperature  by  the  squared  deviation  of  average 
annual temperatures from 14° C in the capital city. The coefficient of this variable is expected to 
be negative. 
Finally,  we  control  for  historical  performance  in  international  football  competitions. 
Following previous literature (Houston and Wilson, 2002; Yamamura, 2008, 2009), we use the 
number of World Cup appearances as measure of historical performance.
13  
Our dataset includes 190 countries.
14 Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics. 
 
3.2. Empirical Specification 
We estimate the following equation: 
                                
                   
                   
             
                                               (12) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in Gelade and Dobson (2007), while others (Macmillan and Smith, 2007; Leeds and Leeds, 2009) try to overcome 
this problem by including dummies for former republic or communist members. 
13 We do not include 2006 and 2010 World Cup appearances in order to avoid endogeneity. 
14 Significant outlier behavior was detected for the effect of population size for China and India and for the effect of 
GDP per capita for Liechtenstein, Qatar, Bermuda and Luxembourg, so these countries were excluded from the 
regressions. No data on GDP pe r capita was available for Montserrat and Tahiti and data on national squad 
composition was insufficient for the Central African Republic, Eritrea, the Solomon Islands and the British Virgin 
Islands, so these countries are also excluded from the regression s. Moreover, we exclude the strongest European 
leagues England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France (Big Five leagues) since the migration index for these countries 
does not measure skill acquisition effects. 16 
 
where         is the number of FIFA points for country  ,       is the migration index,      is 
GDP per capita,      is the population size,       is the temperature variable,       is football 
history,        is historical performance and    is an error term. 
We include both a linear and a quadratic form of the migration index in order to test for 
decreasing returns to migrations, as predicted by the theoretical model. 
This equation is estimated using ordinary least squares. The results are discussed in the 
following sections.  
   
3.3. Regression Results 
Table 5 reports estimation results for different specifications based on model (12). The 
unconditional specification in column (1) yields statistically significant migration coefficients for 
both the linear and the quadratic term. The positive sign for the linear term and the negative sign 
for the quadratic term are consistent with our hypothesis of decreasing returns to migrations.  
In columns (2)-(6) we report regression results including the control variables described 
in section 3.1. In columns (2) and (3), we control for income per capita and population size. In 
line with previous studies, we find positive and significant coefficients for these two variables 
and  negative  and  significant  coefficients  for  their  squared  terms.  Controlling  for  these  two 
variables increases the significance of the quadratic migration term. Regressions (4), (5) and (6) 
respectively add football history, temperature and historical performance as control variables. 
The signs and significance of these coefficients also confirm findings of previous studies. 17 
 
These  empirical  findings  support  the  theoretical  prediction  of  a  positive  effect  of 
migrations  on  international  football  performance.  The  coefficient  of  the  migration  index  is 
positive  and  significant  at  the  1%  level  in  all  specifications.  We  also  find  support  for  the 
theoretical  prediction  of  decreasing  returns  to  migrations.  The  coefficient  of  the  squared 
migration index is negative and significant in all specifications, except for column (5). 
The final specification in column (6) suggests that holding other factors constant, a 1 
percentage point increase in the migration index raises FIFA points on average by 7.725 points 
for  a  country  with  an  average  migration  level.  The  population  of  a  typical  country  should 
increase with around 2.593 million inhabitants to generate approximately the same result ceteris 
paribus. More specifically, our estimations suggest that a developing country like Ghana, with a 
migration index equal to 0.637 (see Table 1), can increase its FIFA points by 32.226 points if its 
index increases by 10 percentage points. This could be obtained if, for example, three additional 
players of the Ghanaian national team migrated to a second rated UEFA league like Belgium.  
 
3.4. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
In this section, we consider extensions and robustness checks of our basic model. 
Our first robustness check is the use of the FIFA ranking as an alternative measure of 
international football performance. Note that the use of the ranking instead of the points leads to 
a loss of information on the variation in performance between nations.  
We estimate the following equation: 18 
 
                                 
                   
                   
             
                       .                      (13) 
Since ranking is a count variable, the appropriate estimation technique for this equation is a 
Poisson regression. However, due to excess dispersion of the rank variable, we estimate (13) 
using negative binomial regression. 
The results of this regression are given in Table 6. The positive effect of migration on 
national team performance is confirmed in all specifications (1)-(6). The prediction of decreasing 
returns to migrations is not confirmed.  
The estimated migration coefficient drops significantly when we control for historical 
performance in column (6). This can be explained by the fact that the migration index may be 
correlated to historical performance. Countries that previously participated in the World Cup 
may attract more attention from foreign talent scouts and their players could more likely obtain 
contracts in foreign clubs.  
Including confederation dummies to models (12) and (13) and including the outliers in 
the sample does not change the results, nor the explanatory power of the regressions.
15 
Our second robustness check aims at insuring that the estimated effect of migration on 
international  football  performance  is  driven  by  countries  with  small  football  markets ,  as 
predicted by the theoretical model . We address this issue in two ways.  First, we  include an 
interaction term between a dummy  variable for UEFA countries and the migration index. We 
expect  this  interaction  term  to  be  negative  since  migration  should  be  more  valuable  for 
                                                           
15 The results of these regressions are available upon request. 19 
 
confederations with smaller football markets. Second, we exclude UEFA countries from our 
sample. 
Regression results  including the  interaction term  between the UEFA  dummy and the 
migration index are presented in Table 7. The linear migration variable is significant at the 1% 
level in both columns (1) and (2), while the quadratic migration variable is only significant in 
column (1), when performance is measured by the number of FIFA points. The negative and 
significant estimated coefficients of the interaction term indicate that migration towards UEFA 
leagues is more valuable for non-UEFA countries. These additional results are broadly in line 
with our theoretical framework. 
The results excluding UEFA countries are reported in Table 8. The coefficient of the 
migration index remains positive and significant at the 1% level, but the squared migration index 
loses its significance. More importantly, the coefficient of the migration index is higher than in 
the estimations using the whole sample  (column (6) of Tables 5  and  6). This  result  is  also 
consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction  that  the  skill  acquisition  effect  should  be  more 
important for countries with smaller football markets. 
A third robustness check deals with the countries in the sample that have a zero migration 
index (see above). Since these countries are numerous, we should check whether they drive our 
results. The estimation results excluding those countries are shown in  Table 9.  The positive 
effect of migration on national team performance is again confirmed in columns (1) and (2). As 
expected, the estimated coefficients of the linear migration term decrease in magnitude since 
countries with low migration and bad national team performance are excluded.  20 
 
A final robustness check deals with the players that had once migrated to a UEFA league, 
but returned to their home leagues in 2007 or 2008. These players acquired skills during their 
UEFA experience, but are not included in our migration index. Including these earlier migration 
patterns in the migration index should increase the value of its estimated coefficient. Table 10 
reports the regression results when the migration index includes returned players. In line with the 
expectations, the migration coefficient is higher. 
A final issue one can be concerned about is the endogeneity of our migration index. If a 
country has more talented players, these players will be more able to migrate to strong leagues. 
Consequently, this  country will have  a higher  migration index, but  also  a better performing 
national  team.  As  we  cannot  directly  control  for  players‟  talent,  there  could  be  an  omitted 
variable problem that could bias upwards the coefficient of our migration index. However, we 
think that  population  size  and football culture, which we control  for,  are a  fair proxy for  a 
country‟s pool of football talent. Moreover, the fact that a player currently plays in the highly 
ranked UEFA league captures the experience effect of playing firstly in lower European leagues, 
since most players do not migrate directly from their home domestic league to the strongest 
European leagues. In the sports literature, there are numerous articles emphasizing that lower 
rated European leagues acts as “nursery hubs” (Andreff, 2009) or as “transition countries for 
potential top players” (Dejonghe, 2001). Hence, if the quality of the league is also a proxy for the 
time that the player has spent training in particular European leagues, then a high migration 
index signals a longer football experience acquired abroad. 
Another potential source of endogeneity is the possibility that well managed national 
football federations are more likely to obtain good results for the national team, but also to 
promote the migration of players.  If this is the case, our estimations could be biased by an 21 
 
omitted variable problem. To investigate this potential endogeneity problem, we compare 2010 
data,  when  restrictions  on  football  player  migrations  were  very  low,  with  1994  data,  when 
restrictions on football  player migrations  were  very high. We restrict the sample to  African 
countries, in order to focus on small football markets.  
We estimate the following equation
16:   
                                                                                       
                                        (14) 
Equation (14) is estimated using ordinary least squares.  
Table  11  reports  the  results.  In  all  columns  (1)-(4),  migration  has  a  positive  and 
significant influence on the evolution of national team performance between 1994 and 2010. In 
line with Ruiz and Fadal (2010), we find that the size of the economy is the only other significant 
driver of African football performance. The final specification (4) suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the migration index increases the evolution of the FIFA ranking between 1994 
and 2010 with 0.285 percentage points. 
To  sum  up,  we  have  found  strong  and  robust  empirical  support  for  the  theoretical 
prediction  that  football  players‟  migration  improves  the  performance  of  national  teams  for 
countries with small football markets. We have found some support, although less robust, for the 
prediction of decreasing returns to migrations on national team performance.  
 
                                                           
16 The temperature variable is excluded from this regression since we focus on the African continent and the World 
Cup appearances variable is excluded since differences in World Cup appearances cancel out. 
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4.  Conclusion 
We investigated the effect of outward migration of football players on the performance of 
their home country national teams. We presented a simple theoretical framework predicting a 
positive effect of players‟ migration rate on national team performance. This positive effect is 
due to the superior skills that migrating players acquire in foreign clubs. We used cross country 
data on national team performance and on the club of employment of national team players to 
test  the  predictions  of  the  model.  We  quantified  the  effect  of  migrations  by  constructing  a 
weighted  migration  index  that  takes  into  account  the  strength  of  the  UEFA  league  and  the 
division of the foreign club of each migrating player.  
After  controlling  for  wealth,  population,  climate,  football  history  and  historical 
performance, we find significant and robust support for the positive effect of player migration on 
international  football  performance.  This  evidence  suggests  that  while  developing  countries‟ 
football clubs may experience a “muscle drain”, their national teams experience a “muscle gain” 
at the same time. 
   23 
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Table 1: Twenty national football teams with highest FIFA points in February 2010 
Country  Points 
Spain  1627 
Brazil  1568 





Germany  1173 





























Table 2: Twenty national football teams with highest migration index   
Country                    Migration index 
Côte d’Ivoire  0.922 
Republic of Ireland  0.833 
Czech Republic  0.828 
Senegal  0.823 
Brazil  0.809 
Nigeria  0.803 
Cameroon  0.75 
Croatia  0.726 

























Table 3: Twenty national football teams with zero migration index, excluding Oceanic and 
Asian confederation countries 



























St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Turks and Caicos Islands 











Notes: (i) See text for Oceanic and Asian confederation. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Variables  Mean  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
FIFA points  378.921  1568  0  320.993 
Migration index  0.204  0.922  0  0.237 
GDP per capita (in 1000$)   13.285  53.269  0.009  13.249 
Population (in 1000000 inhabitants)  20.818  307.212  0.012  41.577 
Football history  1939.326  2002  1873  27.294 
Temperature  83.821  256  0  68.641 
Historical performance  1.432  17  0  2.935 






Table 5: Determinants of international football performance measured by FIFA points 
  Dependent  
variable 
FIFA points 







GDP per capita 
 


















































































































































Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method: ordinary least squares. (iii) 




Table 6: Determinants of international football performance measured by FIFA ranking 
  Dependent variable  FIFA ranking 







GDP per capita 
 


















































































































































Notes:  (i)  In  parentheses  p-values  based  on  standard  errors  robust  to  heteroskedasticity.  (ii)  Estimation  method:  negative  binomial.  (iii) 
Significant variables of interest in bold. 
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Table 7: Determinants of international football performance, including an interaction term 
between UEFA countries and the migration index 
 
Variables 










GDP per capita 
 
































































Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 








Table 8: Determinants of international football performance, excluding UEFA countries 
 
Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 















GDP per capita 
 



























































Table 9: Determinants of international football performance, excluding UEFA countries 
and countries with a zero migration index 
 
Variables 










GDP per capita 
 


























































Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 













Table  10:  Determinants  of  international  football  performance,  including  migrated  but 
home returned players 
 
Variables 










GDP per capita 
 


























































Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method column (1): ordinary least squares, 













Table  11:  Determinants  of  the  variation  in  international  football  performance  between 
1994 and 2010; restricted sample of African countries 
  Dependent variable  Difference in FIFA ranking 
Variables    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant 
 
Difference in migration 
 
Difference in GDP per capita 
 






















































Notes: (i) In parentheses p-values based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. (ii) Estimation method: ordinary least squares. (iii) 
Significant variables of interest in bold. (iv) Not all African countries are included due to data limitations regarding FIFA ranking and national 
squad compositions. (v) FIFA rankings are calculated according to formula (11) in order to account for the increase in the number of FIFA 
members between 1994 and 2010. 